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HOW DID THE TEN COMMANDMENTS END UP ON
BOTH SIDES OF THE WALL OF SEPARATION
BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE?
THE CONTRADICTING OPINIONS OF
VAN ORDEN V. PERRY AND MCCREARY V. ACLU
Tyson Radley O'Connell*
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 27, 2005, in Van Orden v. Perry,1 the United States
Supreme Court held the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment allows a Ten Commandments monument on Texas
State Capitol grounds.2 This opinion appeared to be a major step
forward in Establishment Clause jurisprudence. However, on the
same day, in McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky,3 the Court
held the State of Kentucky violated the Establishment Clause by
posting Ten Commandments displays in two county courthouses. 4
These conflicting judgments do little to clear up the debate
concerning religious monuments on government property. In-
stead, Van Orden and McCreary seem to have opened the flood-
gates to further litigation and blurred the "wall of separation be-
tween church and state."5
This case note explains how the conflicting judgments in Van
Orden and McCreary create unacceptable precedent. Part II pro-
vides background information on the various tests the Court has
applied in Establishment Clause cases. Part III presents the facts
from Van Orden and McCreary. Part IV covers the Van Orden
and McCreary holdings. Part V presents the Court's reasoning for
determining the outcome of each case. Part VI analyzes the con-
tradictions between the Van Orden and McCreary opinions, and
shows why these inconsistencies will create problems in future Es-
tablishment Clause challenges. Part VII suggests alternative ap-
proaches to future Establishment Clause cases.
* Candidate for J.D. 2009, The University of Montana School of Law.
1. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (plurality).
2. Id. at 681.
3. McCreary Co. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
4. Id. at 850-51.
5. See Reynolds v. U.S., 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (quoting Thomas Jefferson's reply to
an address by a committee of the Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1, 1802)).
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II. BACKGROUND OF ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
A. The Lemon Test
Prior to Van Orden and McCreary, the Supreme Court had
issued only one decision concerning the Ten Commandments. 6
This was Stone v. Graham,7 where the Court held a Kentucky
statute requiring the Ten Commandments to be posted in every
public classroom violated the Establishment Clause.8 The Stone
Court reached its conclusion by applying the test established in
Lemon v. Kurtzman.9 This test, known as the Lemon test, has
three prongs. "First, the statute must have a secular legislative
purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must
not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion."10
In developing the Lemon test, the Court recognized, "total
separation is not possible in an absolute sense."'" When dealing
with the Establishment Clause in modern society, "[s]ome rela-
tionship between government and religious organizations is inevi-
table."1 2 Since Lemon v. Kurtzman was decided in 1971, it has
been cited in over 1500 cases and 3200 other documents.1 3 How-
ever, the Lemon test has been criticized for producing unpredict-
able and disputable results.' 4
B. The Endorsement Test
In 1984, the Lemon test received a makeover when the Su-
preme Court decided Lynch v. Donnelly.15 The question before the
Court was whether the Establishment Clause allowed the city of
6. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 737 (Souter, Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
7. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
8. Id. at 41.
9. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
10. Id. at 612-13 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
11. Id. at 614.
12. Id.
13. Search in Westlaw, find citation "403 U.S. 602", citing references tool (Nov. 25,
2007) (yielding 1544 cases and 3248 other documents citing Lemon v. Kurtzman).
14. See e.g. Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398
(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (criticizing the Lemon test, saying "[1]ike some ghoul in a
late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being
repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence once
again, frightening the little children and school attorneys of Center Moriches Union Free
School District").
15. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
2
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Pawtucket, Rhode Island to display a nativity scene. 16 The Court
concentrated on the third prong of the Lemon test and determined
the nativity scene did not "create excessive entanglement between
religion and government."1 7 In a concurring opinion, Justice
O'Connor recognized the difficulty of applying the Lemon test to
future Establishment Clause challenges when she referred to the
three-part Lemon test as "no more than a helpful signpost. 1 8
O'Connor went on to propose a test that concentrated on two fac-
tors. First, does the government statute or practice foster an ex-
cessive entanglement with religion?' 9 Second, does the govern-
ment statute or practice result in the endorsement or the disap-
proval of religion?20
Justice O'Connor's proposal, known as the endorsement test,
has received both positive and negative feedback. 21 Both Van
Orden and McCreary cited Lynch; however, the Court did not
strictly apply the endorsement test in either case. In Van Orden,
the plurality referenced Lynch to show the Establishment Clause
does not require government practices to be void of religious con-
tent.22 In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas referred to
Lynch as an example of the unwillingness of the Court to strictly
apply any single test.23
C. The Coercion Test
The third test the Court has applied in Establishment Clause
cases is the coercion test. The Court applied the coercion test in
Lee v. Weisman,24 and held the Establishment Clause prohibited
public schools from including prayers or other religious exercises
at graduation ceremonies. 25 In Lee, the district court held a public
school's graduation prayer unconstitutional because it violated all
16. Id. at 670-71.
17. Id. at 685.
18. Id. at 688 n. * (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734,
741 (1973) (internal citations omitted)).
19. Id. at 689.
20. Id.
21. See e.g. Co. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pitt. Ch., 492 U.S. 573, 655 (1989) (apply-
ing the endorsement test and holding Allegheny County violated the Establishment Clause
by displaying a creche but not a menorah; Justice Kennedy criticized the test for creating
"an unjustified hostility toward religion") (Kennedy, J., Rehnquist, C.J., White & Scalia,
JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
22. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 690 (2005) (plurality).
23. Id. at 693 n. * (Thomas, J., concurring).
24. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992).
25. Id.
3
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three prongs of the Lemon test.26 The Supreme Court affirmed
the decision but did not apply the Lemon test.27 Instead, the
Court pioneered the coercion test by holding that a State's involve-
ment in school prayers violated the constitutional principle that
government may not coerce individuals to support religion.
28
III. FACTS
A. Van Orden v. Perry
In 2001, Thomas Van Orden sued the State of Texas, chal-
lenging the constitutionality of a monument displaying the Ten
Commandments, located on the Texas State Capitol grounds.
29
Van Orden frequently encountered the monument during visits to
the Supreme Court building, which was "located just northwest of
the Capitol building."30
The three-feet-wide by six-feet-high stone monument is lo-
cated between the Supreme Court building and the Capitol.
31 It is
one of seventeen monuments and twenty-one historical markers
surrounding the Texas State Capitol "commemorating the people,
ideals, and events that compose Texan identity."32 The Ten Com-
mandments monument differs from the other monuments 33 lo-
cated on the Capitol grounds because it has religious significance.
The text on the monument reads:
I AM the LORD thy GOD.
Thou shalt have no other gods before me.
Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven images.
Thou shalt not take the Name of the Lord thy God in vain.
Remember the Sabbath day, to keep it holy.
Honor thy father and thy mother, that thy days may be long upon
the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee.
Thou shalt not kill.
Thou shalt not commit adultery.
26. Id. at 585-86.
27. Id. at 587.
28. Id.
29. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 682 (2005) (plurality).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 681.
32. Id. (citing Tex. H. Con. Res. 38, 77th Leg. (2001) (internal quotations omitted)).
33. Id. at 681 n. 1 (listing the other monuments as: "Heroes of the Alamo, Hood's Bri-
gade, Confederate Soldiers, Volunteer Fireman, Terry's Texas Rangers, Texas Cowboy,
Spanish-American War, Texas National Guard . . . , Tribute to Texas School Children,
Texas Pioneer Woman, The Boy Scouts' Statue of Liberty Replica, Pearl Harbor Veterans,
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Thou shalt not steal.
Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor.
Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's house.
Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife, nor his manservant, nor
his maidservant, nor his cattle, nor anything that is thy neigh-
bor's.3 4
The monument was presented by the Fraternal Order of Eagles of
Texas 35 to the people and youth of Texas in 1961.36 The Eagles
paid to erect the monument, and the ceremony was presided over
by two state legislators.3 7
The district court held the Ten Commandments monument
did not violate the Establishment Clause.38 The court determined
the State had a "valid secular" purpose in displaying the monu-
ment and appreciating the efforts the Eagles have taken against
juvenile delinquency. 39 The court also found the monument to be
a "passive" display that would not lead a reasonable observer to
believe the State of Texas was endorsing religion.40 The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision 41 and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari. 42
B. McCreary v. ACLU of Kentucky
In 1999, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Ken-
tucky brought suit seeking a preliminary injunction to remove
Ten Commandments displays from two county courthouses in
Kentucky.43 The ACLU claimed the displays violated the Estab-
lishment Clause of the Constitution.44
In McCreary County, the legislative body ordered the display
to be posted in a "very high traffic area of the courthouse."45 In
Pulaski County, the Commandments were posted in a ceremony
presided over by the Judge-Executive who was accompanied by
34. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 707 (Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
35. Id. at 701 (Breyer, J., concurring) (describing the Fraternal Order of Eagles as "a
private civic (and primarily secular) organization [that], while interested in the religious
aspect of the Ten Commandments, sought to highlight the Commandments' role in shaping
civic morality as part of that organization's efforts to combat juvenile delinquency").
36. Id. at 707 n. 1 (Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
37. Id. at 682 (plurality).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 682 (plurality).
41. Id. at 682-83, affg Van Orden v. Perry, 351 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 2003).
42. Id. at 683.
43. McCreary Co. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 852 (2005).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 851 (internal quotations omitted).
5
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the pastor of his church. 46 The Judge-Executive called the Com-
mandments "good words to live by" and the pastor told the press
that "displaying the Commandments was one of the greatest
things the judge could have done to close out the millennium. 47
In both counties, the displays included gold-framed copies of
an abridged text of the King James Version of the Ten Command-
ments.48 The text on the displays read:
Thou shalt have no other gods before me.
Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven images.
Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain.
Remember the sabbath day, to keep it holy.
Honor thy father and thy mother.
Thou shalt not kill.
Thou shalt not commit adultery.
Thou shalt not steal.
Thou shalt not bear false witness.
Thou shalt not covet.4 9
Before the district court responded to the ACLU's request for
an injunction, the legislative body of each county issued resolu-
tions authorizing the expansion of each display. 50 The expansions
included eight other documents with religious themes.51
The district court ordered immediate removal of the displays
from both county courthouses and forbade county officials from er-
ecting similar displays.52 In reaching this order, the district court
applied the three-part Lemon test and determined "the original
display lack[ed] any secular purpose because the Ten Command-
ments are a distinctly religious document, believed by many
Christians and Jews to be the direct and revealed word of God."
53
Further, the court found the updated version of the displays
46. Id.
47. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
48. Id.
49. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 851-52.
50. Id. at 852-53.
51. Id. at 854 (listing the other documents as "the 'endowed by their Creator' passage
from the Declaration of Independence; the Preamble to the Constitution of Kentucky; the
national motto, 'In God We Trust'; a page from the Congressional Record of February 2,
1983, proclaiming the Year of the Bible and including a statement of the Ten Command-
ments; a proclamation by President Abraham Lincoln designating April 30, 1863, a Na-
tional Day of Prayer and Humiliation; an excerpt from President Lincoln's 'Reply to Loyal
Colored People of Baltimore upon Presentation of a Bible,' reading that '[tihe Bible is the
best gift God has ever given to man;' a proclamation by President Reagan making 1983 the
Year of the Bible; and the Mayflower Compact").
52. Id.
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lacked secular purpose because the "Count[ies] narrowly tailored
[their] selection of foundational documents to incorporate only
those with specific references to Christianity. ''54
Following the court's order, the Counties changed the dis-
plays a third time. 55 These versions included nine equally sized
documents with the original Ten Commandments' text expanded
to include more extensive quotations.56 The accompanying relig-
ious documents were replaced with eight new documents. 57 The
Counties claimed these documents were "part of the foundation of
American Law and Government."58
The district court did not believe the changes had a secular
meaning and affirmed the injunction requiring the Counties to re-
move the displays. 59 The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
and found the counties' purpose was religious, not educational or
secular. 60 The Supreme Court granted certiorari. 61
IV. HOLDINGS
A. Van Orden v. Perry
On June 27, 2005, in a five-to-four plurality decision, the Su-
preme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit judgment, confirming the
State of Texas's right to display the Ten Commandments monu-
ment.62 To arrive at this conclusion, the Court ignored Establish-
ment Clause precedent and blazed a new trail for Ten Command-
ments displays. The Court did not apply the Lemon, endorsement,
or coercion tests. However, the Court also failed to articulate a
bright-line rule or present a replacement test. Instead, seven Jus-
tices published separate opinions offering fractured insight to-
ward future Establishment Clause claims. 63
54. Id. at 854-55 (quoting ACLU of Ky., 96 F. Supp. 2d at 697, 699).
55. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 855.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 856 (listing the new documents as "copies of the Magna Carta, the Declara-
tion of Independence, the Bill of Rights, the lyrics of the Star Spangled Banner, the
Mayflower Compact, the National Motto, the Preamble to the Kentucky Constitution, and a
picture of Lady Justice").
58. Id. at 857 (internal quotations omitted).
59. Id.
60. ACLU ofKy. v. McCreary Co., 354 F.3d 438, 451 (6th Cir. 2003).
61. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 858.
62. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (plurality).
63. Id. at 679 ("Rehnquist, C.J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an
opinion, in which Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., and Thomas, J.,
filed concurring opinions. Breyer, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Stevens,
7
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B. McCreary v. ACLU
On June 27, 2005, in a five-to-four decision, the United States
Supreme Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit by upholding the pre-
liminary injunction denying the two Kentucky counties' right to
keep their Ten Commandments displays.64 The Supreme Court
concluded the purpose of the displays was "predominantly relig-
ious."65 To arrive at this conclusion, the Court applied the Lemon
test and determined the displays did not have a secular purpose.
66
This contradicted the Van Orden decision, where the Court re-
fused to apply the Lemon test. While the Lemon test is controver-
sial and may be an imperfect solution for determining whether
specific displays violate the Establishment Clause, these contra-
dicting opinions-delivered on the same day-are even more prob-
lematic. Lower courts now face the challenge of wading through
confusing precedent concerning a sensitive area of the law.
V. THE COURT'S REASONING
A. Van Orden v. Perry
Chief Justice Rehnquist announced the Van Orden judgment
and delivered the plurality opinion.67 Justices Scalia, Thomas,
and Kennedy joined the opinion.68 Chief Justice Rehnquist made
it clear the Ten Commandments have religious significance when
he wrote, "lo]f course, the Ten Commandments are religious-
they were so viewed at their inception and so remain. '69 However,
he stressed, "[slimply having religious content or promoting a
message consistent with a religious doctrine does not run afoul of
the Establishment Clause."70 He asserted, there is "no constitu-
tional requirement which makes it necessary for government to be
hostile to religion. '71 The Chief Justice recognized there are lim-
J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsburg, J., joined. O'Connor, J., filed a dissenting
opinion. Souter, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which Stevens and Ginsburg, JJ., joined."
(internal citations omitted)).
64. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 844.
65. Id. at 881.
66. Id. at 864-65.
67. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 681 (plurality).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 690.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 684 (citing Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952)).
Vol. 69270
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its on religious messages and cited Stone v. Graham72 as an exam-
ple of those limits.7 3
Justices Souter, Stevens, and O'Connor filed dissenting opin-
ions. Justice Stevens criticized the plurality for finding a secular
purpose in a Ten Commandments monument that had no connec-
tion with the history of Texas. 74 He said the Van Orden monu-
ment sends a clear message: "This State endorses the divine code
of the 'Judeo-Christian' God."75 Justice Souter stressed that the
Court applied the Lemon test in Stone, the only other case ad-
dressing "the constitutionality of posting the Ten Command-
ments. ' 76 He criticized the plurality for calling the Van Orden
monument "much more passive... than was the case in Stone."77
Then he said, "[t]he problem in Stone was simply that the State
was putting the Commandments there to be seen, just as the mon-
ument's inscription is there for those who walk by it."78
However, the most important opinion came from Justice
Breyer. Justice Breyer provided the swing vote that ultimately
declared the Van Orden Ten Commandments monument constitu-
tional. This vote was the biggest surprise of the judgment, be-
cause Justice Breyer had typically been on the side of enforcing
the Establishment Clause. 79
[He] dissented in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,s 0 where the Court
held that vouchers from the government may be used for parochial
schools. [He] also dissented in Agostini v. Felton,8 1 which allowed
more aid to parochial schools, and Rosenberger v. Rectors and Visi-
tors of the University of Virginia,s 2 which held that the government
cannot deny funding to religious student groups when money is
available to secular groups.8 3
While Justice Breyer's opinion holding the Ten Command-
ments monument constitutional was not expected, it was even
more surprising that Justice Breyer did not accept the majority
view, nor reject all of the dissenting views. He set aside his former
72. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
73. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 690 (plurality).
74. Id. at 707 (Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 737 (Souter, Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
77. Id. at 745.
78. Id.
79. Erwin Chemerinsky, Why Justice Breyer Was Wrong in Van Orden v. Perry, 14
Wm. & Mary Bill Rights J. 1, 2 (2005).
80. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 686 (2002).
81. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 240 (1997).
82. Rosenberger v. Rectors and Visitors of the U. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
83. Chemerinsky, supra n. 79, at 2.
9
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feelings and refused to apply the Lemon, endorsement, or coercion
tests. Part VI compares Justice Breyer's individual Van Orden
opinion to the majority opinion in McCreary with which he con-
curred.
B. McCreary v. ACLU
Justice Souter issued the McCreary majority opinion, in
which Justices O'Connor, Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined.8 4
Justice Souter's analysis centered on "the principle that the First
Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion
and religion, and between religion and nonreligion."8 5 Justice
Souter refused to abandon the purpose prong of the Lemon test,
and affirmed the importance of this prong when he wrote, "the
secular purpose has to be genuine, not a sham, and not merely
secondary to a religious objective."8 6 Next, Justice Souter criti-
cized the dissent for asserting "the purpose test is satisfied so long
as any secular purpose for the government action is apparent."
87
Justice Souter also stressed the importance of using Stone as
a legal benchmark for the constitutionality of Ten Command-
ments displays.8 8 He noted the displays rejected in Stone were
similar to the displays in the Kentucky courthouses because the
original Kentucky displays stood alone and were not part of a sec-
ular display.8 9 He rejected the Counties' argument that the con-
stitutionality of only the third updated displays should be consid-
ered when he wrote, "the world is not made brand new every
morning, and the Counties are simply asking us to ignore per-
fectly probative evidence." 90 This statement affirms that the secu-
lar purpose cannot be a sham. The statement also asserts that if
the original purpose of a display was predominantly religious, a
secular purpose cannot be achieved by looking at the most recent
government action.
84. McCreary Co. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 848 (2005).
85. Id. at 860 (internal quotations omitted).
86. Id. at 864.
87. Id. at 865 n. 13.
88. Id. at 867.
89. Id. at 868.
90. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 866.
Vol. 69272
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VI. ANALYSIS
A. Justice Breyer's Conflicting Opinions in
Van Orden and McCreary
Justice Breyer agreed with the judgment and issued a concur-
ring opinion in Van Orden.91 He joined the majority opinion in
McCreary92 and did not file an individual opinion; therefore, it can
be assumed he agreed with Justice Souter's majority opinion.
However, a number of key points in Justice Breyer's Van Orden
opinion contradict the McCreary majority opinion.
In his Van Orden opinion, Justice Breyer admitted "the Ten
Commandments' text undeniably has a religious message." 93 He
referred to Van Orden as a borderline case and said, "[In such
cases, I see no test-related substitute for the exercise of legal judg-
ment."94 He stressed the judgment must not be a "personal judg-
ment."95 Next, he recognized the Court's prior tests as useful
guideposts, but reasserted that "no exact formula can dictate a
resolution to fact-intensive cases such as this."96 He concluded by
saying the Court should not look solely to the text of the Ten Com-
mandments, but should focus on the context of the display and
how the text is used.97
There is error in Justice Breyer's reasoning. He pointed out
the obvious by calling Van Orden a borderline case without an ex-
act formula for a resolution. He also recognized that, without an
exact formula, the Court's prior tests provide useful guideposts.
But, by failing to apply these useful guideposts, Justice Breyer
seems to reject the previous tests used in Establishment Clause
cases. This includes the Lemon test the majority applied in Mc-
Creary-the same Lemon test Breyer endorsed by concurring with
the majority. By avoiding these established guideposts when
viewing a borderline case, Justice Breyer made his legal judgment
nothing but a "personal judgment." Worse, he failed to establish
clear precedent for future analysis of the same issue.
Justice Breyer also contradicted the McCreary majority opin-
ion by holding the Van Orden Ten Commandments monument
91. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 698 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).
92. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 848 (majority).




97. Id. at 700-01.
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had an adequate secular purpose. He examined the context of the
Van Orden Ten Commandments monument and determined it
had both a religious and secular message.98 However, he ulti-
mately found the monument was predominately secular based on
three factors. First, the monument was donated by the Fraternal
Order of Eagles, a private and primarily secular organization. 99
Second, it was located among seventeen monuments and twenty-
one historical markers on the State Capitol grounds, and not in a
public school like the previously unconstitutional Ten Command-
ments displays. 100 Third, the monument stood for forty years
before it was challenged as an Establishment Clause violation.1° 1
These factors ignore the Stone precedent. The McCreary ma-
jority made it clear the Stone precedent should be followed. "[I]t
will be the rare case in which one of two identical displays violates
the purpose prong ... like displays tend to show like objectives
and will be treated accordingly."10 2 Although the Van Orden Ten
Commandments monument is surrounded by other monuments
and markers and not posted in public school classrooms, the mon-
ument gives the impression the State of Texas is endorsing and
promoting the Ten Commandments. This is very similar to the
State of Kentucky's unconstitutional statute in Stone.
Further, by stretching to find a secular purpose in Van Orden,
Justice Breyer seemed to agree with the dissent in McCreary, who
maintained the Lemon purpose test is satisfied as long as any sec-
ular purpose for the government action is apparent. 0 3 However,
this is very different from the McCreary majority's view that "the
secular purpose has to be genuine, not a sham, and not merely
secondary to a religious objective."10 4
Justice Breyer also turned his back on the McCreary majority
opinion when he stressed the importance of the Van Orden monu-
ment going unchallenged for forty years. He apparently weighed
this heavily in his analysis because he claimed those forty years
are more important than any "formulaic tests" to determine if a
government is "promot[ing] religion over nonreligion." 10 5
98. Id. at 701.
99. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 701 (Breyer, J., concurring).
100. Id. at 702-03.
101. Id.
102. McCreary Co. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 866-67 n. 14 (2005).
103. Id. at 902-03 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J. & Thomas, J., dissenting; Kennedy, J.,
dissenting from Parts II-III).
104. Id. at 864 (majority).
105. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 702 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Vol. 69
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Justice Breyer's McCreary analysis ignores the reality of Es-
tablishment Clause violation claims. Forty years ago there were
no cases challenging the constitutionality of Ten Commandments
displays. The first Ten Commandments case to reach the Su-
preme Court was Stone in 1980. However, the recent increase in
cases challenging Ten Commandments displays 10 6 proves present-
day citizens question the constitutionality of the Ten Command-
ments.
The world is a different place than it was forty years ago. Al-
though over ninety-five percent of religious believers in the United
States practice Christianity, there are millions of atheists, Mus-
lims, and Buddhists living in America. 10 7 "Today there are many
Texans who do not believe in the God whose Commandments are
displayed at their seat of government. Many of them worship a
different god or no god at all."' 08 It is not surprising the Van
Orden monument went unchallenged for forty years. There is lit-
tle incentive to bring an Establishment Clause violation claim
against the government.
Suing a State over religion puts nothing in a plaintiffs pocket and
can take a great deal out, and even with volunteer litigators to sup-
ply time and energy, the risk of social ostracism can be powerfully
deterrent. I doubt that a slow walk to the courthouse, even one that
took 40 years, is much evidentiary help in applying the Establish-
ment Clause.
1 0 9
By asserting the Van Orden monument is predominately sec-
ular because it went unchallenged for forty years, Justice Breyer
seems to imply the constitutionality of a display can change over
time. The constitutionality of a display should not hinge only on
how long the display went unchallenged in a court of law. Placing
such importance on the amount of time a display stands is an arbi-
trary approach to determining whether the display violates the
Establishment Clause. Under this reasoning, the Kentucky dis-
plays Justice Breyer found unconstitutional in McCreary would be
106. Id. at 721 n. 19 (Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting) ("See e.g. Mercier v. Fraternal
Or. of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 2005); ACLU Neb. Found. v. Plattsmouth, 358 F.3d
1020 (8th Cir. 2004); Adland v. Russ, 307 F.3d 471 (6th Cir. 2002); Summum v. Ogden, 297
F.3d 995 (10th Cir. 2002); Books v. Elkhart, 235 F.3d 292 (7th Cir. 2000); State v. Freedom
from Religion Found., Inc., 898 P.2d 1013 (Colo. 1995); Anderson v. Salt Lake City Corp.,
475 F.2d 29 (10th Cir. 1973).").
107. Id. at 719 n. 18 (Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting) (citing U.S. Dept. of Com-
merce, Bureau of Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2004-2005, 55 tbl. 67
(124th ed. 2004)).
108. Id. at 720.
109. Id. at 747 (Souter, Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
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constitutional if they were erected in 1959 instead of 1999. Fol-
lowing Justice Breyer's "no harm, no foul" approach will produce
inconsistent precedent in an important area of constitutional law.
This is not a solid system for deciding the constitutional rights of
United States citizens.
B. Why No Test Is Unacceptable
Van Orden and McCreary prove the Supreme Court Justices
hold a wide array of opinions about the Establishment Clause.
Justices Souter, Ginsburg, Stevens, and O'Connor support the
principle of neutrality between the government and religion and
assert, "the government may not favor one religion over another,
or religion over irreligion."110 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Jus-
tices Thomas, Kennedy, and Scalia believe government can favor
religion.111 As the previous section demonstrated, Justice Breyer
seems to float between the two schools of thought.
In McCreary, Justice Scalia filed a dissenting opinion and was
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Thomas and Ken-
nedy. The McCreary dissent insisted, "the Court's oft repeated as-
sertion that the government cannot favor religious practice is
false." 112 He gave George Washington's first Thanksgiving Proc-
lamation referring to "that great and glorious Being who is the
beneficent author of all the good that is, that was, or that will
be,"1 13 and prayers referring to "God" that opened sessions of the
Supreme Court under Chief Justice John Marshall as examples of
government favoring religious practice. 1 14
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Thomas, Kennedy, and
Scalia are not fond of the Lemon test. They refused to apply the
Lemon test in Van Orden, because it is "not useful in dealing with
the sort of passive monument that Texas has erected on its Capi-
tol grounds." 11 5 In the McCreary dissenting opinion these Justices
claimed the Lemon test creates hostility against religion by focus-
ing on the apparent purpose of government action, rather than the
110. McCreary Co. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 875 (2005) (majority).
111. Id. at 885 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J. & Thomas, J., dissenting; Kennedy, J., dis-
senting from Parts II-III).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 886.
114. Id.
115. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 686 (plurality).
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actual purpose of government actions. 116 Further, the dissent be-
lieved McCreary improperly heightens the government purpose
prong of the Lemon test from simply having a secular purpose to
having a predominantly secular purpose. 11 7 The dissent argued
the purpose prong of the Lemon test should be abandoned rather
than expanded, and warned that the McCreary majority opinion
set dangerous precedent. 18 The dissent concluded by asserting
the Court did not identify evidence to prove the first, second, or
third McCreary displays had the intent to further religion.' 19
The McCreary dissent did not believe posting a Ten Com-
mandments display in a "high traffic area" and having a commu-
nity leader like the Judge-Executive preside over the posting was
an unconstitutional endorsement of religion. They also considered
the three-feet-wide and six-feet-high stone Ten Commandments
monument from Van Orden to be a "passive" display. Therefore, it
is clear they will never see eye-to-eye with Justices Souter, Gins-
burg, Stevens, and O'Connor who agreed with the McCreary ma-
jority opinion and dissented in Van Orden. However, differences
in personal beliefs are no excuse for ignoring Court precedent.
In Van Orden, the Court did not apply any of the tests used in
previous Establishment Clause cases. As a result, all nine Jus-
tices overlooked the fact that the posting of the Van Orden Ten
Commandments monument was presided over by two state legis-
lators. 20 This is similar to the posting ceremony analyzed under
the Lemon test in McCreary and certainly seems relevant when
considering whether a government action violates the Establish-
ment Clause. While this may not be sufficient evidence to make
the Van Orden monument unconstitutional, it was mentioned in
the facts section of the case and, therefore, should have been ana-
lyzed. Because the Court failed to analyze this evidence, practi-
tioners and lower court judges will have to speculate whether or
not it is important that a government official presided over a Ten
Commandments posting ceremony.
Contradicting judgments like Van Orden and McCreary prove
the current system the Court uses to deal with Establishment
Clause cases is not working. Issuing an opinion like Van Orden
116. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 900-01 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J. & Thomas, J., dissenting;
Kennedy, J., dissenting from Parts II-III).
117. Id. at 901.
118. Id. at 902.
119. Id. at 912.
120. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 682 (plurality).
15
O'Connell: Separation between Church and State
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 2008
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
without applying precedent or laying out an alternative test is a
reckless approach to developing Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence. If the Court does not agree with the Lemon, endorsement,
or coercion tests, it is time to develop a new test. The Court could
take many approaches to develop a new test. Three possible alter-
natives are listed below.
VII. THREE POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE TESTS
A. The Strict Language Test
The first option the Court could apply in future Establish-
ment Clause cases is the strict language test. Under this test, the
Court would concentrate on the First Amendment language that
deals with religion: "Congress shall make no law respecting an es-
tablishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."121
This approach would allow government officials to endorse relig-
ion and promote specific religions over other religions-as long as
no laws were passed to establish religion or prohibit the free exer-
cise of religion. This test would throw current Establishment
Clause precedent out the window.
The strict language test has advantages. It is a black-and-
white test that would be easy to apply in most situations. Under
the strict language test, the monuments in Van Orden and Mc-
Creary would be constitutional. Only Ten Commandments dis-
plays required by law would be unconstitutional. Therefore, the
Kentucky statute in Stone requiring the Ten Commandments to
be posted in public schools would still be unconstitutional. How-
ever, government officials could preside over Ten Commandments
posting ceremonies. The Governor of Texas could kneel and pray
before the Van Orden monument every morning. He could begin
his speeches with an introduction endorsing a specific religion.
Under this test, only laws establishing religion or prohibiting the
free exercise of religion would be unconstitutional.
Although the strict language test would be easy to apply, it
has disadvantages. Most notably, it makes a long history of case
law void. It would overrule the Lemon, endorsement, and coercion
tests without retaining any of the positive attributes of these
tests. Further, it would turn United States citizens' beliefs about
acceptable mixing of religion and government upside down. Ignor-
ing rational expectations and developed case law would probably
121. U.S. Const. amend. I.
Vol. 69278
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not be a popular alternative among attorneys, United States citi-
zens, or lower court judges, and it would likely "create the very
kind of religiously based divisiveness that the Establishment
Clause seeks to avoid."122
B. The Zero Tolerance Test
The second option is the zero tolerance test. Under this test,
the Court would not tolerate any mixing of church and state. This
test would go beyond the plain language of the First Amendment
and attempt to achieve what some people believe Jefferson in-
tended when he talked about the "wall of separation between
church and state."1 23
The zero tolerance test would also be a black-and-white test
that disregards previous case law. Under this test, all religious
displays on government property would be unconstitutional.
However, it would be difficult to draw a line at what constitutes
acceptable behavior of government officials regarding religion.
For example, the zero tolerance test would not allow the Governor
of Texas to start his speeches with a prayer. But neither would
this test allow the Governor to say, "God bless you," when his staff
member sneezed. More problems would arise if the Governor at-
tended church, or sent his child to a private Catholic school. Gov-
ernment officials would be forced to adopt behavior that is not con-
sistent with the reality of life. The zero tolerance test would cre-
ate another major problem because money minted by the United
States Treasury could no longer contain the words "In God We
Trust."
A cost-benefit analysis of the zero tolerance test shows the
test is unreasonable because it is not consistent with the reality of
life. This test would bring up the problems the Lemon Court rec-
ognized when it concluded, "total separation is not possible in an
absolute sense, [because] [slome relationship between government
and religious organizations is inevitable."124
C. The Middle Ground Test
The third option is the middle ground test. Under this test,
the Court would combine previous Establishment Clause prece-
122. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 704 (Breyer, J., concurring).
123. Reynolds v. U.S., 98 U.S. 145, 164 (quoting reply from Thomas Jefferson to an ad-
dress by a committee of the Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1, 1802)).
124. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971).
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dent into a single test. The Court could combine the Lemon, en-
dorsement, and coercion tests with the passive context factor from
Van Orden to create a three-part test that could be applied to stat-
utes, practices, or displays.
The middle ground test would ask three questions. First,
does the statute, practice, or display foster an excessive govern-
ment entanglement with religion? Second, does the statute, prac-
tice, or display endorse or disapprove of religion, or coerce support
of religion? Third, is the statute, practice, or display passive, or
does it overstep the bounds of acceptable government behavior?
The middle ground test would not result in a unanimous judg-
ment in every Establishment Clause case. However, it would cre-
ate a test that could be consistently applied to determine whether
a statue, practice, or display violates the Establishment Clause.
For example, Justice Scalia may believe the Van Orden monu-
ment:
(1) does not foster an excessive entanglement in religion because
(2) does not endorse or disapprove of religion, or coerce support of
religion because ... ; and
(3) is a passive display that does not overstep the bounds of accept-
able government behavior because ....
At the same time, Justice Breyer may believe the Van Orden
monument:
(1) does not foster an excessive entanglement in religion because
(2) does endorse religion because ... ; and
(3) is a passive display that does not overstep the bounds of accept-
able government behavior because ....
If all nine Justices applied this three-part test to the Van
Orden display, there would be a clear record of how each Justice
feels about the three key elements of the test. Consistently apply-
ing this test would create solid Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence. An attorney challenging a Ten Commandments monument
in Missoula, Montana may disagree with Justice Scalia's analysis
of the Van Orden monument. But the middle ground test would
allow the attorney to dissect Justice Scalia's opinion and then de-
cide if the Ten Commandments monument in Missoula can be dis-
tinguished from the Van Orden monument before bringing an Es-
tablishment Clause challenge.
The middle ground test is not a flawless solution to Establish-
ment Clause jurisprudence. However, it is a test that would give
confused attorneys, individuals, and lower court judges a better
Vol. 69280
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idea of how the Court may rule on a specific Establishment Clause
challenge.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The contradicting judgments in Van Orden and McCreary will
likely lead to inconsistency in future Establishment Clause cases.
The Supreme Court Justices seem to agree the current tests are
not useful in deciding every challenge to the Establishment
Clause. Unfortunately, Van Orden and McCreary are a step back-
ward instead of a step forward. The Court muddied a sensitive
field of law by applying the Lemon test in McCreary but failing to
apply it in Van Orden. Further, the Van Orden Court avoided the
endorsement and coercion tests and failed to present an alterna-
tive test. Resolving Van Orden without providing clear directions
to follow in future Ten Commandments cases creates shaky prece-
dent. If the Court is not satisfied with the Lemon, endorsement,
and coercion tests, it is time to overrule these tests and adopt a
new alternative. The test the Court adopts is important, but con-
sistently applying the test is even more important. Lower courts,
attorneys, and American citizens need, and deserve, solid Estab-
lishment Clause precedent.
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